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Abstract
IPv6 off-link host enumeration, when compared to IPv4 host enumeration, is a difficult and expensive exercise.
The expense arises from the difference in address space sizes between the two protocols, with IPv6 having a 2 96
larger address space than that of IPv4. This paper presents an algorithm for performing contextual IPv6 host
enumeration against a target. The algorithm uses passive and active enumeration in order to focus the search
upon areas of the address space where it is more probable that targets will exist. Experiments were conducted to
test the proposed adaptive heuristic search algorithm involving applying the algorithm to a test dataset of IPv6
addresses, measuring the results and comparing those to a linear search against the same datasets. This
research shows that the adaptive heuristic search algorithm achieved an average of 9,975 successful hits per
simulation when applied to a dataset of realistic IPv6 addresses, whilst the linear search had an average of
8,642 when applied to the same dataset. Both algorithms performed poorly when applied to a dataset
comprising randomly generated IPv6 addresses. The results show that the algorithm provides a good candidate
for IPv6 off-link host enumeration, as it outperformed the linear search on average, whilst using less probes to
do so.
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INTRODUCTION
Although IPv6 has existed for a number of years, performing off-link host discovery is still not a common
practice, nor is it considered practical to do so. Host enumeration is the act of locating devices on computer
networks. On-link host discovery, where the source is on the same network as the target(s) is made relatively
easy with IPv6 through the use of the Neighbour Discovery Protocol (NDP), which is utilised by IPv6 for
discovery purposes. Off-link host enumeration occurs in situations where the source node is on a logically
separate network to the target(s), and is more difficult. Currently very few tools and methods exist to address the
problem of off-link host discovery against IPv6 networks.
The complexity of the problem arises from the increased address space IPv6 offers over IPv4, which is 296 times
larger, and recommends a standard network size of 64 bits (264 possible host addresses). To exhaustively
enumerate a standard 64 bit IPv6 subnetwork, it would take 585,000 years at the rate of 1,000,000 generic
probes per second (Polc ́ak, 2014). By contrast a common network size in IPv4 is 24 bits (leaving 28 possible IP
addresses for hosts), which would take less than a second to exhaustively enumerate at the same rate.
There is evidence to suggest that the means by which addresses are allocated can create patterns, which can
influence new host discovery search algorithms (Atlasis, 2014). This paper presents a novel search algorithm
designed to perform off-link IPv6 host discovery against 64 bit subnetworks. The algorithm differs from
conventional approaches by implementing a feedback loop and decision-making systems to increase the
probability of successfully probing a device. Experiments were conducted to compare the proposed proof of
concept search algorithm to conventional approaches.

HOST ENUMERATION METHODS
Host enumeration methods can be classified into either active or passive enumeration. Active enumeration
methods are those that involve probing target systems directly to enumerate devices. The active enumeration
method category encompasses the following components:



The target address space: The target address space is the range (or ranges) of addresses that are valid
targets for the host enumeration exercise.
The probe target(s): Not to be confused with the target address space, this refers to the address that
probes will actually be delivered to. The distinction is made, since the target address may differ from
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the target address space in cases that involve leveraging special addresses (such as the on-link methods
using multicast addresses).
The search algorithm: The search algorithm is the feature of the host enumeration exercise that
determines the order in which targets are probed. The search algorithm can be deterministic in nature or
stochastic.
The protocol: The protocol relates to the actual protocol used to deliver the probe and receive a
response. Examples of protocols for probing include ICMP Echo Requests, TCP SYN segments, ARP
requests, etc.
The probe payload: Probe payload refers to the contents of the probe. In some cases a generic payload
may be used, in other cases specifically crafted payloads may be used. The payload can be used to test
for specific vulnerabilities in services, or trigger specific responses from devices to ascertain whether a
host is alive. Examples of payloads include randomised data or specifically crafted HTTP GET
requests.

Examples of active enumeration methods include ping sweeps and SYN Scanning. Passive enumeration
methods are those that do not probe target systems directly, but rather use other means to enumerate targets
(Zalewski, 2005). The passive enumeration method category encompasses the following components:





Reconnaissance subject: The subject of the passive enumeration exercise. It could be an IP address,
network, domain name, email address, etc.
Reconnaissance object: The device or system being interacted with to gain information about the
reconnaissance subject
Protocol: The protocol relates to the actual protocol that is used or examined to gather information
about the reconnaissance subject. The protocol could be DNS, SNMP, HTTP, or Ethernet frames or
IP(v4/v6) packets.
Payload: The payload is the data that is either sent or examined from communications to gather
information. For example, in a DNS enumeration, the payload may be a list of subdomains in a query.
The response payload may be the answers from the DNS server (the A or AAAA record depending on
the reconnaissance subject). In a passive network monitoring enumeration, the payload would be the
data held within packets that are interesting to the observer.

As an example, DNS enumeration and passive network sniffing are passive enumeration methods.
As mentioned previously, active enumeration methods generally employ a search algorithm to determine where
and how to distribute probes. For reference, on-link enumeration for IPv4 and IPv6 can be achieved by
leveraging native discovery protocols such as IPv4’s Address Resolution Protocol (ARP) or IPv6’s Neighbour
Discovery Protocol (NDP) to determine active devices that are on-link. There are few successful off-link host
enumeration search methods commonly used to enumerate IPv4 devices. There are, in essence, two approaches,
linear or sequential searching, and randomised searching. Linear searching, which involves testing each possible
address consecutively in an address space, is commonly employed due to it’s simplicity and low complexity of
O(n). Randomised searching offers the benefit of distributing the searching probes across the address space,
which reduces load on destination networks. Additionally distributing the search load can aid in evading
detection from intrusion detection systems or firewalls.
Randomised searching, despite its benefits, does increase computational complexity. The extent of the increased
complexity depends on the randomisation algorithm being employed. For example, the utility zmap uses a
computationally inexpensive randomisation function in the form of a basic linear congruential generator (LCG).
The use of an LCG allows the tool to randomly search every address in the range of possible IPv4 addresses,
without duplications (Durumeric et al. 2014). The application nmap on the other hand uses a routine to shuffle
addresses in memory, which negatively impacts on the performance of the tool since additional overheads are
incurred (Graham, 2012).
With optimisations, the process of enumerating the entire IPv4 address space can be completed in a few hours
(Graham, 2013). As a result, it is commonplace to conduct exhaustive searches of IPv4 subnetworks or the
public IPv4 Internet, where each possible address in the space is probed. The same does not hold true for IPv6,
however. Attempting an exhaustive search of even a single IPv6 subnetwork is not practical given current
computational and network resources. With IPv6 off-link host enumeration, efforts usually involve linearly
searching a subset of the address space or performing “context searching”. Approaches such as those used by
The Hacker’s Choice IPv6 toolkit’s alive6 (Hauser, 2015) take into account context about the IPv6 address space
prior to scanning. The tool builds a static list of potential targets to probe, which is a subset of the entire space.
The target list is generated by considering common usage of IPv6 in the real world, where administrators may
include hexadecimal words in their IPv6 addresses, such as ‘beef’, ‘cafe’ or ‘face’.
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ADAPTIVE HEURISTIC SEARCH ALGORITHM
One identified issue with conventional host enumeration strategies is that active and passive enumeration
methods are regarded independently. For IPv4 enumeration exercises this is of little concern, given that active
enumeration has been proven to effectively identify devices. With respect to enumeration exercises involving the
IPv6 protocol, there is the potential for passive enumeration to aid in reducing the scope of the problem, by
identifying candidate targets with a higher probability of existing. This information, coupled with knowledge
about how IPv6 addresses can be constructed, can provide the agent conducting the enumeration exercise with
context by which to reduce their enumeration scope. The use of both active and passive enumeration methods
has been incorporated into the development of the adaptive heuristic search algorithm.
The adaptive heuristic search algorithm can be deconstructed into four main steps:
1.
2.
3.
4.

Choose a destination IPv6 network or domain (e.g. example.com or 2001:db8:1:1::/64)
Perform passive enumeration against the target
Classify results and build target list
Probe target nodes, and repeat from 3

The proposed algorithm is depicted in Figure 1 below.

Figure 1 – Adaptive heuristic search algorithm data flow depicting the major processes involved in the
algorithm.
The proposed algorithm requires some context of the target in order to conduct passive enumeration. For
example its domain name, the target IPv6 network address, or the IPv6 addresses of some of the target’s
services. The algorithm proposed comprises a feedback loop, which uses classification to make decisions about
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target nodes. The benefit of performing prior reconnaissance is so that the algorithm is given context about the
target. Since the IPv6 address space is so vast, attempting to scan completely blind may never yield any results.
By providing the algorithm with a starting point, it is able to assess the type of address allocations used and
make appropriate decisions about the best choice of node to probe next.

Proof of concept
A proof of concept implementation of the adaptive heuristic search algorithm was designed for this study. A
program was constructed that implemented the adaptive heuristic algorithm using the Python 2.7.5 programming
language and the third-party libraries pandas, numpy, scikits-learn and pybrain.
Any addresses that were discovered throughout the experimentation process were classified into address
construction categories. For classification a classifier based upon the ANN classifier described in Carpene,
Johnstone & Woodward (2014) was used. The classifier determined whether the input address was constructed
using the modified EUI-64 method (i.e. the method used during SLAAC where privacy extensions are disabled
(Thomson, Narten, & Jinmei, 2007)), Incremental or manual assignment, or stochastic assignment (i.e. addresses
that use Privacy Extensions, DHCPv6 random allocation, or some other random allocation scheme).


EUI-64: For addresses that were classified as ‘EUI-64’ a range of addresses were constructed within the
increment_range
same MAC address OUI scope in such a way that start_point = n −
and end_point =
increment_range





2

while end_point < max, else start_point = 264 − increment_range and
n+
2
end_point = max − 1 where n is the current target and max = 264 .
Incremental or manual assignment: If an address was classified as ‘Incremental’ then a range
increment_range
increment_range
calculation was used such that start_point = n −
and end_point = n +
2
2
while end_point < max, else start_point = 264 − increment_range and end_point = max − 1 where
n is the current target and max = 264 .
Stochastic assignment: For addresses classified as Stochastic, a binary entropy test was conducted to
confirm the efficacy of the classification. If the binary entropy test failed (i.e. it returned a result less
than 0.7), the classification was determined to be false and the target classified as “Unknown”. On the
other hand, if the test passed (i.e. the results were greater than or equal to 0.7), 65536 random targets
were added to the target list for probing.

The hosts in the target list were then probed using some generic probing procedure (simulated using membership
tests in this instance). If a valid reply was received (i.e. the membership test succeeded) the address was added to
a list of “alive” hosts and then passed to the classification system. From there further potential targets were
added and the iterative process repeated. Once the potential targets were exhausted the process quit and the
results of the experiment were gathered.
The linear search algorithm was also implemented using the Python 2.7.5 programming language. This
algorithm served as a baseline for standard approaches to host enumeration. The linear search algorithm
designed for this research resembled the following:
1.
2.
3.
4.

Randomly select a start address to use as the Target
Probe Target
Increment Target by 1 (e.g. “::432” becomes “::433”)
Repeat from 2 until maximum number of probes had been exceeded.

EXPERIMENTATION
To test the efficacy of the proposed algorithms a simulated enumeration of two target networks was performed.
Two datasets of IPv6 addresses, representing computer networks, were constructed. The first dataset, the
Randomised dataset, was generated stochastically using random number generators. This dataset contained
50,000 unique IPv6 addresses. The second dataset, the Surveyed dataset, was collected from public information
sources through a DNS enumeration of IPv6 records. This process was described in detail in (Carpene &
Woodward, 2014). The surveyed dataset contained 41,171 unique IPv6 addresses.
The experimental process involved using computer simulations to test the subject search algorithm against the
target IPv6 datasets. 100 simulations were performed involving each independent algorithm and dataset
permutation. These simulations were conducted on a cluster of computers using parallel processing to execute
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simultaneously. The third-party Python 2.7.5 multiprocessing library scoop was used to manage and control
processes during the experiments.
Table 1 - Experimental parameters for the computer simulations involving the test search algorithms
Experiment Name

Dataset

Maximum
probes

transmitted

Number of Simulations

Adaptive-1a

Randomised IPv6 Addresses

4294967296

100

Adaptive-1b

Surveyed IPv6 Addresses

4294967296

100

Linear-1a

Randomised IPv6 Addresses

4294967296

100

Linear-1b

Surveyed IPv6 Addresses

4294967296

100

RESULTS
The results for the experiments are included in Table 2.
Table 2 - Results of the experiments involving the adaptive heuristic search and the linear search algorithms
Experiment
Name

Successful probes to valid IPv6
Addresses

Number of probes delivered

Max

Min

Mean

Median

Max

Min

Mean

Median

Adaptive-1a

100

100

100

100

6553719

6553700

6553704.99

6553704.0

Adaptive-1b

11276

7756

9975

10004

672606286

441850500

588694674.39

589243218.5

Linear-1a

1

0

0

0

4294967296

4294967296

4294967296

4294967296

Linear-1b

16284

0

8642

16284

4294967296

4294967296

4294967296

4294967296

Adaptive Heuristic Search Algorithm
The Adaptive-1a experiment involved conducting 100 simulations of the adaptive heuristic search algorithm
against the randomised dataset of IPv6 addresses. In each simulation, 100 IPv6 addresses were provided to the
algorithm as the initialising data, returned from the passive enumeration component. It was observed that 0
additional valid addresses were discovered through the active enumeration phase of the process across all of the
performed simulations, meaning that the search algorithm performed poorly against randomly generated IPv6
addresses. An average of 6,553,704 probes were delivered per simulation during Adaptive-1a.
The Adaptive-1b experiment saw the adaptive search algorithm tested in 100 simulations against the surveyed
dataset. It was observed that on average for each simulation the search algorithm correctly identified 9,975 valid
IPv6 addresses using an average of 588,694,674 probes per simulation. The maximum number of valid IPv6
addresses identified was 11,276, whilst the minimum number was 7,756.

Linear Search Algorithm
Similarly to the Adaptive-1a experiment, the Linear-1a failed to produce any meaningful results. When the linear
search algorithm was applied to the randomly generated dataset of IPv6 addresses, a maximum of one IPv6
address was discovered across all 100 simulations. 4,294,967,296 probes were delivered during each simulation
in Linear-1a. Again, these results imply that the linear search algorithm is not a good candidate for discovering
devices on networks where devices have been configured using stochastic address construction methods.
The Linear-1b experiment observed the greatest number, as well as the lowest number of discovered valid IPv6
addresses across all of the experiments conducted. In each simulation for Linear-1b, 4,294,967,296 probes were
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delivered to potential targets. The maximum number of valid IPv6 addresses discovered by the linear search
algorithm was 16,284, whilst the minimum was 0. The mean number of valid IPv6 addresses discovered across
all simulations in the Linear-1b experiments was 8,642.
Figure 2 shows box and whisker plots for the successful probes to valid IPv6 addresses for each experiment
performed during this study.

Adaptive−1a

Adaptive−1b

Linear−1a

Linear−1b

Experiment name
Figure 2 - Boxplots showing the number of probes delivered to valid IPv6 hosts for each simulation across each
experiment.

DISCUSSION
As can be seen from the results, there is significant potential for the adaptive heuristic host enumeration
algorithm. The search algorithm proved to be effective at enumerating devices on IPv6 networks where
addresses were not constructed through random generation, and may therefore be applicable to real-world
deployments. It was observed that the linear search algorithm enumerated more valid IPv6 addresses in some
simulations than the adaptive heuristic search algorithm. Despite this, the adaptive search algorithm performed
more consistently than the linear search algorithm, and had a greater mean number of detected IPv6 addresses
across all of its simulations. Additionally, the adaptive heuristic search algorithm achieved these results using on
average 13.70% of the number of delivered probes compared to the linear search during testing. These results
highlight that the adaptive algorithm can reliably search IPv6 networks where some prior information about the
subject is available.

CONCLUSION
Off-link IPv6 host enumeration is still in its infancy, with little in the way of formalised approaches on the topic.
The approaches that do exist do not offer flexibility in their generation of target addresses. This paper presents a
novel approach to performing the task of IPv6 host discovery and validates its effectiveness when compared
against conventional approaches. The proposed algorithm was validated against the conventional approach of
using linear search to enumerate a subset of the address space. It was observed that the proposed adaptive
heuristic search algorithm performed more consistently than the conventional linear search algorithm for the task
of enumerating off-link IPv6 networks.

FUTURE WORK
Future work will see continued development of the adaptive heuristic search algorithm. The next phase of this
research is currently underway and will involve trialling the algorithm in a real world environment against live
IPv6 deployments.
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